In the following interview with Manlio Iofrida, Aldo Giorgio Gargani retraces the fundamental moments and key phases of his intellectual development: his early childhood and adolescence in Genoa, strongly marked by the influence of his artist father and of the social context of the immediate post-war situation; his studies at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, and subsequently at the University of Oxford, which resulted to his first book on Wittgenstein; the achievement during the 1960s of a distinctive philosophical (...) position of his own, reflected in the publication of the book Il sapere senza fondamenti [Knowledge without Foundations]; the renewal of philosophical culture in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s, in which Gargani himself was one of the main protagonists; the return to an engagement with Wittgenstein, after a period in which he had dedicated himself principally to literary questions and concerns, one pursued specifically in the context of the new issues raised at the beginning of the 21st century. This historical and autobiographical reconstruction of his intellectual career is accompanied at every turn by philosophical reflections on our contemporary situation and by specific critical responses to other contemporary philosophical trends and developments: the interview thus constitutes a telling summation of the fundamental themes and aspects of the author’s thought in general. (shrink)

This paper describes the topological aspect of a logic-based, artificial intelligence approach to formalising the qualitative description of spatial properties and relations, and reasoning about those properties and relations. This approach, known as RCC theory, has been under development for several years at the University of Leeds. The main rationale for this project is that qualitative descriptions of spatial properties and relationships, and qualitative spatial reasoning, are of fundamental importance in human thinking about the world: even where quantitative spatial data (...) are most important, they must be attached to the components of a perceived spatial structure if we are to make use of them. RCC theory covers other qualitative aspects of spatial description and reasoning, but the topological properties and relations of spatially extended entities are fundamental to our work. The topological formalisms used by mathematicians are, in general, not well suited to the task of formalising the kinds of ‘common-sense’ or ‘everyday’ qualitative spatial description and reasoning which are our primary interest. Nevertheless, we must come to grips with the concepts of topology as practised by mathematicians if we are not to risk constantly ‘reinventing wheels’. (shrink)

It was with this bitter intervention from Thrasymachus, occurring halfway through the first of its ten Books, that that work begins to come urgently alive. For the remainder of Book I the Socrates of the Dialogue asks questions and raises objections, while Thrasymachus keeps urging that in fact the just become through their very justice the victims of exploitation–the suckers!

Bateson's belated acceptance of the chromosome theory came in two main stages, and was permanent, although he retained to the end reservations about some implications and extensions of the theory. Coleman's attempt to explain Bateson's resistance in terms of his conservative mode of thought is critically examined, and rejected: the attributes Coleman assigns to Bateson are all either inappropriate, or irrelevant to chromosome theory, or both. Instead, the diverse factors which contributed to Bateson's resistance are enumerated and discussed. These include (...) deficiencies in the evidence then available to support the theory; embryological difficulties; Bateson's aversion to microscopy combined with the lack of a close colleague skilled in cytology; his iconoclastic temperament, and the fact that he found T. H. Morgan, the leader of the Drosophila school, an uncongenial personality. Taken together, these factors suffice to account for his resistance. Bateson's position is contrasted with that of the other most eminent opponent, W. Johannsen, whose organismic outlook was the main obstacle to acceptance. (shrink)

At their extremes, the modernization of ancient mathematical texts (absolute presentism) leaves nothing of the source and the refusal to modernize (absolute antiquarism) changes nothing. The extremes exist only as tendencies. This paper attempts to justify the admissibility of broad modernization of mathematical sources (presentism) in the context of a socio-cultural (non-fundamentalist) philosophy of mathematics.

Suffering patients (when able), grieving families and compassionate physicians have always sought the least detrimental alternative while deciding care in the face of tragedy. Modern medical technology has brought great benefits to patients but has blurred traditional concepts of life and death and created new dilemmas for practising doctors. While this technology has given doctors great control over living and dying, their dominance in critical decision making is being challenged. More and more their decisions are liable to public and legal (...) scrutiny, intense publicity by the news media and exploitation by lobbyists with opposing aims. Increasing pressure of this kind may deflect the physician form his primary responsibility to patients and their families. For infants with gross malformations or a distressing terminal illness we believe that the parents and their doctors must be allowed primary decisional power even if the chosen course of action involves the death of the infant. Choices for death should be permitted but only after suitable family and professional consultation. Some general guidelines are suggested. As these situations are so varied and so complex, much latitude in decision-making should be expected and tolerated. (shrink)

Why is it that despite having many of the same concerns on how ethics may be included in undergraduate medical curriculums, I write to state my concerns on Cowley’s formulation and conclusions.1I think my main problem is with an argument that starts from a position of criticising “universalising”, but offers as a substitute the idealising of another universality—“their own healthy intuitions and vocabulary”. What is it that can help in promoting an appreciation of what may be a “healthy”, as opposed (...) to an “unhealthy”, intuition? At the risk of immediately undermining my argument by indulging in psychoanalytical …. (shrink)

Mitchell et al.'s claim, that their propositional theory is a single-process theory, is illusory because they relegate some learning to a secondary memory process. This renders the single-process theory untestable. The propositional account is not a process theory of learning, but rather, a heuristic that has led to interesting research.

Based on the proceedings of a 1985 conference held in the U.K., this volume embraces most of the important concerns in AI today, emphasizing common techniques and methodologies rather than applications. Topics covered include building efficient computational logic, planning and design, the representation of uncertain knowledge, user modelling, and psychological and philosophical issues. Papers on perception, theorem proving, expert systems, robotics, and data bases are also included. Each section is preceded by an introduction which draws comparisons between various papers.